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Abstract 
 
We investigate evidence the existence of optimal capital structure and 
carry out an examination across countries and industries to detect 
systematic capital structure differences. In particular, we examine 
whether firms aim for an optimal capital structure through changing their 
debt ratios over time. We find evidence for the presence of systematic 
patterns in debt ratios and in the ways firms adjust their capital 
structures. This is indirect evidence for the optimal capital structure 
model and suggests firms seek the correct capital structure based on 
firm, industry, and country factors. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Capital structure theories based on asymmetric information, such as the 
pecking order, market timing, and inertia theories deny the existence of an 
optimal capital structure, while the trade-off and dynamic trade-off theories 
suggest that firms will seek the best mix of debt and equity to maximize firm 
value. At present, the argument remains unresolved. Prior studies, identify 
reasons why it has been difficult to find evidence that firms adjust their debt 
ratios. For example, Hovakimian and Li (2011) argue that there is no clear 
evidence that firms change their debt levels because moving towards their 
target capital structure may not be a policy priority. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
argue that as firms have different tax rates and tax deductions, each firm has a 
unique target debt ratio. Consequently, firms that operate under different tax 
rates, bankruptcy risk, and securities issuing costs, will have different optimal 
debt ratios. Therefore, it has been difficult to observe clear patterns and 
adjustment in debt ratios that would imply firms are moving towards their 
optimal capital structure. When combined with differences in firms’ target debt 
levels, related to their individual circumstances, it means clear evidence is 
lacking for the existence of target debt ratios and by implication optimal capital 
structure. A key problem in prior studies is that if firms are slow or patchy in 
adjusting their debt ratios and face different firm and country specific conditions 
this leads to less significant statistical results. 
 
Although it is difficult to find statistically convincing evidence, using a large 
sample of firms across industries and countries, we seek systemic patterns in 
debt ratios in line with industries in which firms operate and the evidence for 
firms’ debt ratio adjustments in line with the optimal capital structure theories. A 
key motivator for the present study is that since Stonehill and Stizel (1969) there 
has been little research that compares firms’ debt ratios based on industry and 
country characteristics. We contend that if there are systematic patterns in 
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leverage levels with respect to firms’ characteristics, we can infer that firms are 
targeting an optimal capital structure. This is because, if there is no optimal 
capital structure, firms will not seek to change their debt ratios towards a target 
and, therefore, firms’ debt ratios would be randomly distributed without regard to 
firms’ characteristics.  
 
There is much prior research that considers the relationship between a firm’s 
debt ratio and its characteristics, particularly industry and country. For example, 
Mackay and Phillips (2005) argue, that firms’ leverage levels are strongly 
related to their industries. In addition, the authors show that industry factors 
affect firms’ leverage levels and bankruptcy costs. Qi et al. (2010) identify the 
importance of the country in which firms operate in influencing their debt ratios, 
which they attribute to differences in tax policies, the political environment, 
financial markets, and legal systems. To our knowledge, there have been no 
studies which compare firms’ debt ratios between countries and industries, and 
across different time periods, since Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) and Scott and 
Martin (1975). Our study extends their analyses in a number of ways. First, we 
use a more extensive data set; second we take account of a wider set of capital 
structure theories; and third, we make use of new variables and instruments in 
order to identify statistically significant patterns in firms’ capital structures. 
 
In addition, as further evidence for the existence of optimal capital structures, 
we test for firms’ behavior when adjusting their capital structure, including speed 
of capital structure adjustment, and the choice of debt or equity when new 
securities are issued. The speed at which firms adjust their capital structure 
confirms that over time firms change leverage levels. Net debt and equity issue 
patterns also provide evidence for firms’ behavior in adjusting their debt ratios. 
For instance, in this paper, we consider the patterns for debt and equity 
issuance as evidence for the trade-off theory. This is because we find that for 
the period of our data firms mainly issue equity. Although we do not precisely 
know why firms mainly issue equity, we can presume that this situation is not 
related to the pecking order or market timing theories, as our data indicate low 
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stock prices and weak profitability during our sample period.  
 
We find some important phenomena in our results. First, there are systematic 
and statistically significant patterns in capital structures across industries, 
countries, and over time. Firms in high technology industries such as 
biotechnology, software, and semiconductors have low debt ratios; whereas, 
across countries, firms in the hotel, marine transportation, aluminum, and travel 
industries have high leverage levels. Second, firms generally reduce debt levels 
over time mainly by issuing equity. We consider that all these results support the 
trade-off theory rather than the pecking order and market timing theories. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and the 
motivation for the study. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 
4 shows the results of our analyses, including ANOVA tests, speed of capital 
structure adjustment, and the issuance of debt and equity. We conclude and 
summarize our findings in Section 5.   
 
2 Literature review and motivation for the research 
 
With the exception of the static trade-off theory, the pecking order (Myers, 1984), 
market timing (Baker and Wurgler, 2002), and the inertia theory (Welch, 2004) 
all deny the presence of an optimal capital structure. Evidence on the existence 
of optimal capital structure is still controversial, although many researchers, 
such as Megginson (1977) and Graham and Harvey (2001), find there is a 
pattern in leverage levels that matches industry classifications. After carefully 
reviewing earlier research, we find the last major empirical study that compared 
debt ratios across industries was by Stonehill and Stizel (1969), who examined 
the debt ratios of multinational firms based in different countries and industries. 
They showed that firms evidenced more similar in-industry debt ratios than 
across different industries. 
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The majority of recent studies, such as those by Frank and Goyal (2009), Welch 
(2004) and Qi et al. (2010), take account of important factors that influence the 
financial structure decision, such as the speed of capital structure adjustment, 
stock price and political rights, and how these determinants can be used to 
differentiate between the static trade-off, pecking order, and market timing 
theories. However, without knowing the optimal debt ratios, testing important 
determinants not may be the correct approach, as debt ratio determinants 
already imply the existence of optimal capital structures. Following Stonehill and 
Stizel (1969), and using a larger and more up-to-date sample of firms that 
operated under different economic circumstances, we investigate whether 
systematic patterns in debt ratios, with respect to industry and country, are 
indicative of the existence of optimal capital structures and hence lend support 
to the static or dynamic trade-off theories. 
 
Purnanandam (2008) finds that firms in the same industry have similar leverage 
levels, maintain these over time and that this differs between industries. 
Furthermore, industries relate to debt ratio factors, such as bankruptcy costs, 
liquidation values, asymmetric information, collateral value, and micro-economic 
industrial business trends. All these factors, of course, also relate to capital 
structure theories. This is because firms in different industries have different 
assets and operating risks, while firms in the same industry face similar 
business risks and hold similar assets. Furthermore, industry factors are also 
important for firms’ credit ratings and financial managers consider competitors’ 
leverage levels (Graham and Harvey, 2001). Masulis (1983) also argues that 
firm values are high for those firms whose debt ratios are close to their industrial 
average. Consequently, this suggests firms in a particular industry choose to 
have ratios that approximate to their industry average as a way of maximising 
their value. This also suggests the likelihood of the existence of a pattern of 
industry-based debt ratios that are not randomly distributed. 
 
Different countries have different tax rates, degrees of industrialization, financial, 
political, and legal systems (e.g. bankruptcy law and financial market 
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regulations), and we presume that these factors affect firms’ debt ratios. For 
example, both the trade-off theory and Graham’s (2000) argument suggest that 
the corporate tax rate affects capital structures, together with bankruptcy costs. 
Both the tax rate and bankruptcy costs, through bankruptcy policy, are strongly 
related to a country’s macroeconomic policies. Furthermore, each country has a 
different financial market system. For example, Japan and European countries 
(France and Germany) have more bank-oriented economies as compared to 
the United States and the United Kingdom. According to Antoniou et al. (2008), 
bank-oriented countries suffer less from asymmetric information because 
financial institutions, such as banks, are better able to collect information about 
firms than individual investors in capital markets. If this argument is correct, we 
can presume that firms in countries like Japan and France will have 
systematically different leverage ratios compared to those in the United States 
and Great Britain due to differences in asymmetric information. Qi et al. (2010) 
suggest a relationship between political systems and firms’ debt levels in that 
firms with greater political rights have lower debt costs. They also suggest that 
political stability leads to a stable microeconomic environment. These studies 
directly or indirectly suggest that firms’ debt ratios will be affected by country 
factors. 
 
Both the market timing and pecking order theories can explain firms’ debt ratio 
reducing behavior based on either overvalued stock prices or periods of rising 
income, or a combination of both. Under the timing theory, firms issue equity 
when they consider their stock price overvalued compared to its fundamentals. 
Leverage also decreases when firms operating income increases faster than 
dividend payouts. In the trade-off theory, firms will reduce debt levels when they 
confront financially difficult periods such as recession. The above implies that 
firms’ debt ratios will shift over time, in line with the situation in financial markets 
and macroeconomic cycles. Indeed, previous research, such as Graham (2000) 
and Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) find that debt ratios change over time. For 
instance, Graham (2000) finds that firms used more debt during 2000s than in 
the 1980s. On the other hand, Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) show that, during 
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their sample period (from 1997 to 2002), French firms reduced their leverage. 
These studies support the argument that firms adjust their debt ratios over time. 
 
As indicated above, factors such as industry, country, and time affect firms’ 
capital structure decisions. However, since the papers by Stonehill and Stitzel 
(1969) and Scott and Martin (1975), there has been no research that examines 
the differences in debt ratios from industry, country, and time effects. Although a 
number of papers investigate the trade-off theory by testing the capital structure 
determinants and the speed at which it is adjusted, we still do not have clear 
conclusions about the existence of an optimal capital structure. The present 
research contributes to the literature by extending Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) in 
a number of ways. It will be the first systematic examination of the 
interrelatedness of industry and country effects since that paper. In addition, we 
expand the number of countries and the time periods for the analysis. In 
particular, we look at emerging market countries in addition to developed market 
ones. 
 
A further motivation is that, from prior research and our own data, we find that 
firms occasionally issue and retire both equity and debt at the same time. The 
pecking order theory cannot explain this behavior. Due to transaction costs, 
firms should either issue equity or debt to adjust their debt ratios, not issue both 
securities concurrently. The pecking order theory even suggests that firms 
should not issue any securities in order to save adverse selection costs. 
However, most prior research uses debt issue and changes in firms’ debt ratios 
to observe firms’ issuance choices in order to test the pecking order theory. 
Therefore, we believe we can improve on previous research by using a new 
variable, pure issuance, which allows us to segregate firms’ intention to 
increase or decrease its leverage in situations where there are mixed 
transactions. We believe that this approach better indicates firms’ real intention 
in altering their capital structure for those firms which simultaneously issue both 
equity and debt. 
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3 Data and methods 
 
Our data consists of 2,823 listed firms from fourteen industries and nine 
countries for the period 1989 to 2008. Firms’ financial and other data is 
collected from Thomson One Banker. Our sample consists of all companies 
from the aluminum, heavy construction, marine transportation, biotechnology, 
airline, hotel, travel and tourism, fixed line telecommunication, mobile 
telecommunication, computer services, internet, software, computer hardware, 
and semiconductor industries. The selected companies are domiciled in 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, France, 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. To be included, the companies must have data for at 
least two or more years during our sample period. To ensure data integrity, we 
winsorize some values as outliers since they greatly distort results. For instance, 
we remove the data for firms which have debt ratios if the value is greater than 
2.00, or is negative. For market-to-book ratio (M/B), we remove observations 
that are greater than 10 and smaller than zero. For other items, we also remove 
as outliers the data if their values are greater or smaller than 3 standard 
deviations from the average. 
 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A in Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample of 32,410 firm-
year observations. Panel A, indicates some variables are not normally 
distributed. For example, the kurtosis of the debt ratio (DR), financial deficits 
(def), capital expenditure (capex), the stock return (SR), corporate tax (tax), 
market-to-book (M/B), and profits indicates that these variables are leptokurtic. 
The skewness statistic shows that corporate tax rate, profits, def and capex are 
asymmetric. The descriptive statistics for stock return (SR), market-to-book ratio 
(M/B) and profits also indicate that many firms are potentially financially 
distressed. One-half of the firms in the sample generate less than 3 percent in 
profit in relation to their total assets, 75 percent have low market values based 
on their M/B, and about half see a fall in their stock prices compared with the 
previous year. This may also indicate unfriendly macroeconomic conditions 
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during our sample period. 
 
Table 1 Panel B presents the correlation between the variables. Generally, there 
is no significant correlation, with the exception of the bankruptcy probability (BP) 
and the debt ratio (DR), which is not surprising; and although high, it is still 
acceptable for modeling purposes. Our unreported VIF tests indicate there is no 
serious multicolinearity in our models. We therefore use these two variables in 
the same model. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2 ANOVA test 
In order to investigate the existence of capital structure patterns we apply an 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test. As mentioned earlier, if there is no optimal 
capital structure, firms do not change their capital structure in systematic ways. 
Consequently, there should be no statistically significant differences in leverage 
levels between firms in particular countries and industries. On the other hand, if 
there is an optimal capital structure that maximizes a firm’s value we can expect 
that firms will likely be close to their optimum and, if the optimal leverage relates 
to firms’ characteristics, there will be a noticeable pattern to firms’ debt ratio. 
The ANOVA test will indicate whether there are significant differences in firms’ 
debt ratios based on their characteristics. 
 
3.3 Partial adjustment process and System GMM 
We also consider that firms only partially adjust their capital structures in any 
given period. The idea behind this is straightforward. If there is an optimal 
capital structure, firms will try to be close to, or at, it. However, because of 
transaction costs, firms will not always fully adjust their capital structure. To 
model this, we apply the following equation: 
 
DRt-DRt-1 =αt + λ(DR*t- DRt-1) + εt (1) 
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where, DR is a firm’s debt level; DR* is the firm’s optimal capital structure; λ is a 
coefficient for the speed of adjustment towards the firm’s optimum capital 
structure, calculated using an auto regressive parameter.  
 
In a world without transaction costs, from Equation (1) as DR*t is the optimal (or 
target) capital structure, DRt should be DR*t in the next period and λ will be one. 
However, when there are costs to adjusting the debt ratio, λ will lie between 1 
and 0 (1 > λ > 0). Hence we estimate the following equations: 
 
DRt=α+(1- λ)DRt-1+ λDR*t+εt (2) 
  
DRi,t=α+(1- λ)DRi,t-1+Σλβ·Xi,t-1+εt (3) 
 
where, DR, DR* and λ are as above and Σ Xi,t-1 is the sum of capital structure 
determinants for firm i at time t. 
 
Equation (1) can be rewritten as Equations (2) and (3), if the target debt ratio 
(DR*) is determined by the capital structure determinants (Σβ·Xi,t-1). In Equation 
(3) we presume that the target debt ratio is defined by the previous year’s 
capital structure determinants. This implies that firms decide their optimal 
capital structure based on their situation in the previous year. For example, if a 
firm has a high probability of bankruptcy then it is likely to issue equity in the 
future to reduce this risk.  
 
Based on previous research, we selected the following proxies for the 
determinants of firms’ capital structure: annual stock return (SR), asset 
tangibility (tang), capital expenditure (capex), market-to-book ratio (M/B), profits, 
firms’ size (size), corporate tax rate (tax), and bankruptcy probability (BP). 
Therefore, the model for firms’ optimal capital structure determinants is: 
 
DR* i,t= αt+β1·SR i,t-1+ β2·tang i,t-1+ β3·capex i,t-1+ β4·M/B i,t-1+ β5·profits 
i,t-1 + β6·size i,t-1 + β7·tax i,t-1 + β8·BP i,t-1 + εt 
 
(4) 
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DR i,t=α+(1-λ)DR i,t-1+ β1·SR i,t-1+ β2·tang i,t-1+ β3·capex i,t-1+ β4·M/B i,t-
1+ β5·profits i,t-1 + β6·size i,t-1 + β7·tax i,t-1 + β8·BP i,t-1+ εt 
 
(5) 
 
As there are transaction costs, we expect that λ to fall between 1 and 0. Values 
1 > λ > 0 would provide support for the trade-off theory. 
 
3.4 An endogeneity problem in panel data and System GMM 
From Equations (2), (3) and (4), we can estimate λ in Equation (5), and we use 
‘system general method of moments’ (System GMM) for Equation (5) because 
the panel data is in general endogenous and has idiosyncratic errors that are 
heteroskedastic and correlated within individual samples. System GMM has 
been developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) for 
panel data which have a short time period (T) and a large number of individual 
cases in the sample (N). Furthermore, the dynamic form of an estimator, such 
as an autoregressive (AR) model, also has an endogeneity problem. As can be 
seen from Equations (2), (3) and (5), we use a dynamic model of capital 
structure adjustment. For our study, we use a simple form of the dynamic model 
as shown in Equation (6): 
 
yi,t = αi + yi,t-1 + Xi,t + εi,t (6) 
 
From Equation (6), we develop Equation (7): 
 
(yi,t - yi,t-1) = αi + λ(yi,t-1 - yi,t-2 ) + (Xi,t - Xi,t-1 ) + (εi,t - εi,t-1 )  (7) 
 
where λ is an auto regressive parameter for the speed at which firms move 
towards their optimal capital structure. 
 
From Equation (6), we can see that (αi + εi,t) is correlated with yi,t-1. In addition, 
Equation (7) indicates a correlation between (yi,t-1 – yi,t-2 ) and the error term (εi,t 
– εi,t-1 ) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). In order to remove the correlation, we use 
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instrumental variables instead of using (yi,t-1 – yi,t-2 ). To be a good instrumental 
variable, it needs to fulfill two conditions. It should correlate with the regressor 
(yi,t-1 – yi,t-2 ) and not correlate with (εi,t – εi,t-1 ). If it fulfills these two conditions, 
any variable can be an instrument. Most researchers generally use one, two, or 
t period lagged regressors as instruments. For example, from Equation (7) yi,t-2 
is correlated with the regressor (yi,t-1 – yi,t-2 ) and not correlated with the error 
terms (εi,t – εi,t-1 ). Furthermore, lagged Xi,t or ∆Xi,t can likewise be instruments. 
There is no criterion over how many instruments should be used; however, 
increasing the number of instruments increases the chance of multicolinearity 
between the variables.  
 
GMM is generally used to solve an endogeneity problem in a dynamic model. 
Furthermore, if there is a heteroskedasticity problem, GMM is superior to 
instrumental variables (IV); and if it is not, then GMM gives the same 
asymptotical results when compared to IV (Baum et al. 2003). Based on the 
type of instrument, various configurations of GMM, Differences GMM, Levels 
GMM and System GMM have been introduced. System GMM addresses a 
weakness in Differences and Levels GMM. In System GMM differenced 
variables can still be predetermined and may not be strictly orthogonal with 
idiosyncratic errors. A weak instrument problem can also arise in the Levels 
GMM with persistent instruments. Furthermore, according to Hayakawa’s (2007) 
finding, Differences GMM has a downward bias, and Levels GMM has an 
upward bias, but System GMM cancels out both biases. Therefore, we use a 
two-step System GMM estimator in order to obtain reliable results given the 
nature of our data. In addition, the two-step estimator is asymptotically more 
efficient. 
 
3.5 Financial deficit and security issuance 
Frank and Goyal (2003) use Equation (9), to test the pecking order theory. They 
expect that the coefficient sing for ‘def’ in equation will be positive if the pecking 
order theory is correct as firms issue only debt when they need cash due to 
transaction costs; on the other hand, in the market timing theory, firms issue 
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equity with overvalued prices. However, from previous research, such as 
Hovakimian et al. (2004) and from our data set, we observe that many firms 
issue (or retire) debt and equity at the same time. For example, about half of the 
firms in our sample issue (or retire) debt and equity together in the same year. 
This implies that we cannot clearly distinguish whether firms issue debt or 
equity in a certain year when they need cash. We therefore develop a new 
variable that more clearly indicates firms’ choices between debt and equity. We 
call this variable ‘pure issuance’ and define it by subtracting net debt issue from 
net equity issue. Hence, pure issuance more readily indicates firms’ actual 
choices between debt and equity when they issue both. We define pure 
issuance as follows: 
 
Pure issuance = net equity issue – net debt issue = (total equity issue 
– equity repurchase) – (total debt issue – total debt 
retirement) 
 
(8) 
ΔDRt = αt + β∙deft + εt (9) 
Pure issuancet = αt + β∙deft + εt (10) 
where, def is the financial deficit as defined by Frank and Goyal (2003).  
 
Applying Frank and Goyal’s (2003) Equation (9), and using our new variable the 
‘pure issuance’, we test the pecking order theory using Equation (10). 
 
3.6 Descriptions of variables 
We summarise all the variables, instrumental and control, and the other 
variables, including capital structure determinants that we use in our models in 
Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Some comments on our variables are called for. As regards calculating the debt 
ratio, there is no clear criterion for using book or market based debt ratios. 
According to Hillegeist et al. (2004), book-value-based debt ratios are over-
leveraged due to the conservative accounting principle. Market-value-based 
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debt ratios, on the other hand, change dramatically over time as the stock price 
changes. As we are interested in firms’ capital structure decisions and want a 
stable measure of leverage, we use a book measure. To measure amount of 
cash that a firm needs for its operation, we use Frank & Goyal’s (2003) 
definition of financial deficit. Under the pecking order theory firms issue debt 
when they do not have enough cash, and issue equity under the market timing 
theory if the stock price is overvalued. Financial deficit is therefore a key 
variable to test both the pecking order and market timing theories. 
 
The stock return is one of the most important capital structure determinants in 
the pecking order and market timing theories. Myers (1984) asserts that firms 
issue only debt when they need cash as there are higher asymmetric 
information costs on stocks than on debt. On the other hand, the market timing 
theory (Baker and Wurgular, 2002) argues that firms opportunistically issue 
equity when stock prices are higher than warranted by the firm’s fundamentals. 
These two arguments indicate that both theories are based on asymmetric 
information. Underpricing and overpricing both occur due to a lack of 
information in the market. However, the market timing argument suggests the 
opposite behavior to that proposed by the pecking order theory.  
 
Tangibility relates to firms’ bankruptcy and asymmetric information costs. The 
majority of prior research suggests that firms which predominantly have tangible 
assets have higher liquidation values. Tangibility also relates to asymmetric 
information as external investors can have a better idea of a firm’s business or 
the purpose of tangible assets when firms hold tangible assets rather than 
holding cash. As the tangibility of firms’ assets reduces asymmetric information 
increases and liquidation values decrease, consequently it should have a 
positive effect on debt issuance and the debt ratio.  
 
Similar to asset tangibility, capital expenditure also relates to liquidation costs, 
industry classification, and asymmetric information. This implies that capital 
expenditure likewise relates to the trade-off and pecking order theories in the 
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same way as high tangible assets have higher liquidation values and lower 
information asymmetry. This implies that capital expenditure has a positive 
association with debt issuance. 
 
The market-to-book ratio (M/B) is market participations’ expectation of a firm’s 
growth in the future and a high M/B indicates high stock prices relative to 
fundamentals. The market-to-book ratio therefore is an indicator for both the 
pecking order and market timing theories, as firms’ growth expectations relate to 
the information on firms and their stock prices. According to both theories, the 
market-to-book ratio has a negative association with the debt ratio. In the 
market timing theory, a high stock price leads a firm to issue equity. For the 
pecking order theory, a high stock price indicates low asymmetric information 
costs and this increases the likelihood firms will issue equity, as a low market-
to-book leads firms to only issue debt.  
 
Profit is also an important capital structure determinant as it affects firms’ 
financial strength and debt capacity. In the pecking order theory, profits have a 
negative association with debt ratios because profits increase equity as well as 
total assets. However, in the trade-off theory, firms with high profits will issue 
debt because high profits make firms deviate below their optimal capital 
structure. 
 
Total assets is indicative of the size of a firm and is important to both the 
pecking order and trade-off theories. Bigger firms generally imply a lower level 
of asymmetric information (Frank and Goyal, 2003) as they are more exposed 
in the public. Firm size also indicates bankruptcy probability, as larger firms are 
at less risky than smaller ones (Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008). This implies that 
a firm’s size is positively associated with the debt ratio in both the static trade-
off and pecking order theories. 
 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1963) tax is the most important and controversial 
determinant in capital structure theories. It is an important variable in developing 
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optimal capital structure with variable bankruptcy costs. Contrary to Modigliani 
and Miller (1963), much research such as Shefrin (2007) suggests that the tax 
rate is not important for debt ratio decisions. However, Korteweg (2010) argues 
that the tax shield is about 5.5% of firms’ values. The bankruptcy probability (BP) 
through bankruptcy costs is important for the trade-off theory. This argues firms 
balance bankruptcy costs against the advantages of the tax shield from debt to 
maximize firms’ values by minimizing their after-tax weighted average cost of 
capital. Much prior research, for instance Shefrin (2007), makes the argument 
that bankruptcy costs are more important than the tax shield. We consequently 
include both the corporate tax rate and the probability of bankruptcy because 
these affect firms’ decision whether to issue debt or equity. 
 
We use a combined Z-score model to measure firms’ bankruptcy probabilities in 
line with their countries of origin. Altman develop the original Z-score model for 
US manufacturing firms and the Z”-score model is for non-US firms in 
developed market, and the EMS model is for firms in the emerging markets1. 
We therefore use the Z-score model for US companies, the EMS model for 
Korean and Taiwanese firms, and the Z”-score model for firms which originate 
from all the other countries in our sample. For the all bankruptcy models using 
in this paper, we give a value of 1 if a firm is in non-bankruptcy area, 3 if it is in 
bankruptcy area, and 2 if it is in the between non-bankruptcy and bankruptcy 
area. In order words, if a firm is in non-bankruptcy area in Korea, in Japan or in 
Britain, its value is 1 although the non-bankruptcy area is determined by each 
different bankruptcy probability model according to the firm’s nationality. We 
expect a negative association between debt issue and BP as firms with a high 
probability of bankruptcy would issue equity to reduce their debt ratio. 
 
                                               
1 Z-score, Z”-score and EMS models are developed by Altman in 1968, 2002, and 2005 
respectively. 
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4 Analysis and results 
4.1 Analysis of variance tests 
 
For ANOVA tests, we classify our sample based on time periods, industries, and 
countries. We first separate our sample into two equal time periods, 1989 to 
1998 and 1999 to 2008. As we mentioned in the previous section, we also 
classify our sample into the 9 different countries and 14 different industries used 
in our sample.  
 
Table 3 Panel A reports the results for the ANOVA test for the two sub-periods 
and this shows that there are significant differences in the average debt ratios 
between the two periods. This indicates that firms have adjusted their capital 
structure between the two time periods. Panel B provides a country-by-country 
level breakdown of Panel A. Eight out of nine of the countries show a 
statistically significant difference between the two periods. Only the United 
Kingdom does not show any statistically significant differences. Overall, Table 3 
supports the static trade-off theory, as only trade-off theory makes the case for 
firms to systematically adjust their debt ratios.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In Table 4, we also investigate whether there are systematic differences in debt 
ratio between countries. To do this, we initially use the whole sample period and 
Panel A shows that there are statistically significant the differences in debt ratios 
between countries. In Panel B, we do another test, separating the sample into 
the two sub-periods. One particularly interesting finding is that for the sample 
countries the debt ratios converge in the second period, a factor confirmed by 
the much higher F values for the earlier period compared to the later period 
(96.46 versus 41.34). This is shown graphically in Figure 1. We attribute this to 
a weakening of country effects due to factors such as globalization and the 
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increasing standardization of financial and business norms.2 Even though the 
difference in debt ratios between countries is smaller in the second sub-period, 
the table still indicates there is a big difference in capital structure. This result 
still supports the trade-off theory as only the trade-off theory suggests non-
random contribution of debt ratio. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Table 5 reports the results of our industry-based tests and indicates significant 
statistical differences exist. Panel A uses the whole time period and sample 
classified by industry while, as above, Panel B breaks the sample into the two 
sub-periods.  
 
In Table 6, we finally present firms’ debt ratios and leverage adjustment 
classified by industry. From Panel A, we note that, when we consider mean 
values, firms in 8 out of 14 industries have reduced their debt ratios, and when 
we use medians, it is 12 industries. This indicates that there is a pattern to the 
way firms adjust their leverage over our sample period. In Panel B, we arrange 
industries based on their mean and median debt ratios, and rank them in 
ascending order. We observe that there are two clear groups of industries. 
Firms in the biotechnology, software, semiconductor, computer hardware, 
computer service, heavy construction and the internet industries have low debt 
ratios. On the other hand, firms in the aluminum, mobile telecommunication, 
airline, fixed-line telecommunication, hotel, travel and marine transportation 
industries have high debt ratios. This industry-related pattern to firms’ debt 
ratios accords with Scott and Martin (1975) and Harris and Raviv (1991), who 
find there are noticeable patterns across industries.  
                                               
2 One can note factors such as the widespread introduction of International Financial Reporting 
Standards, increasing popularity of cross-listings and the growth in international portfolio 
investment as potential influences that lead firms towards a “global” capital structure standard. It 
should be noted our sample is made up of relatively large firms and is more influenced by such 
factors than would be the case for purely local firms. 
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Our results in Tables 3 to 6, indicate significant differences in debt ratios based 
on firms’ characteristics and support the trade-off theory as only this theory 
implies the existence of systematic patterns.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
4.2 Firms’ choice of debt or equity and the speed of 
adjustment of their capital structure 
 
In this section, we investigate whether, when firms raise finance, there is a 
pattern in their choice of financing sources between equity and debt and 
whether they adjust their debt levels. To do this, in Panels A and B, we use 
financial deficit (def), as defined by Frank and Goyal (2003), for firms’ cash 
needs to test the association between the change in a firm’s debt ratio (ΔDR) 
and firms’ financial deficit (def); and between pure issuance (pur) and firms’ 
financial deficit. Our argument here is that firms which are financially 
constrained and have little or no financial slack, as measured by our financial 
deficit measure, will issue debt. This presupposes that financially constrained 
firms will issue debt, as debt has little adverse selection costs in the pecking 
order theory.  
 
Panel A in Table 7, using Equation (9), presents negative associations between 
def and ΔDR. Only four countries out of the nine show a statistically significant 
relation between def and ΔDR, and the relationships are all negative. There are 
six countries with negative coefficients, including the non-significant ones, while 
three countries have positive coefficients but these are not statistically 
significant. This implies that firms generally use equity or operating profits for 
their financial needs. As observed from the descriptive statistics in Table 1, we 
know that for our sample it is not the case they are simply using operating 
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profits for their financial needs. We therefore conclude that the negative 
coefficients in our results are caused by equity issuance. 
 
In Panel B, using Equation (10), we test the relation between ‘def’ and ‘pure 
issuance’ across countries. Compared to ‘def’ and changes in leverage, our 
results indicate a strong positive correlation in that eight countries out of the 
nine have a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Only Taiwanese firms 
show a negative coefficient; and although this is significant, the coefficient level 
is close to zero. The results for def and pure issuance also indicate that firms 
mainly use equity to address financial deficits. 
 
In our third test in Panel C, using Equation (5), we investigate the speed of 
capital structure adjustment for the sample countries using two-stage System 
GMM. The results indicate that firms for all the sample countries adjust their 
capital structure, although the speed varies between countries. As the 
coefficient is ‘1-capital structure adjustment speed (λ)’, firms in Australia, 
Canada, the US, Korean and Taiwan have a high rate of capital structure 
adjustment speed compared with Japan, UK, and France. We partly attribute 
these differences to differences in institutional and macro-economic 
environmental factors. For instance, Korean firms changed their capital 
structure rapidly after the Asian financial crisis in 1997.    
 
From the above analyses, we can conclude that firms in our sample adjust their 
capital structures and, in doing so, principally issue equity. As discussed earlier, 
systematic debt ratio adjustment is evidence for the trade-off theory and as 
firms mainly use equity to adjust their capital structures, we can reject the 
pecking order theory. If we link our results with the financial condition of the 
sample and the underlying macroeconomic conditions over the time period, the 
evidence suggests firms issue equity to reduce their debt ratios in order to 
reduce their risk of financial distress. The reason is due to the adverse financial 
and economic conditions that prevailed. Such behavior accords with the trade-
off model where firms rationally balance the advantages of the debt tax-shield 
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against agency and financial distress costs. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
We start this paper with one question: whether there is an optimal capital 
structure for firms. We mainly test our question in two ways that, we believe, 
can improve previous research with providing more clear and reliable 
conclusions. First, firms’ debt ratios will not be randomly distributed if there are 
optimal capital structures for firms. As firms should adapt to their environment to 
survive; and if they do, characteristics such as industry and external factors 
such as recession would affect firms’ debt ratios. As a consequence, firms in the 
same industry have a similar debt ratio compared to firms in other industries. 
Second, when they change their debt ratios to increase or decrease leverage, 
the majority of firms in an industry act the same way. It is because, when firms 
confront a shift in the economic environment, they show similar behaviors, such 
as decreasing debt ratios or issuing equity in a recessionary period. 
 
As we expected, our results clearly indicate systematic patterns in capital 
structure across industries and over time. Firms in high-technology industries 
have low debt ratios compared to firms in traditional, high tangible asset, 
industries. We also notice a distinct secular trend in that firms reduce debt ratios 
over the sample period, regardless of industry and country and mainly use 
equity for their financial needs. We also observe that country factors greatly 
affect firms’ debt ratios. We find that both debt ratios and capital structure 
adjustment speeds vary across countries. Our result in Table 6 presents that, in 
terms of mean value, firms in 8 industries and, in terms of median value, in 12 
industries among 14 industries have reduced their debt ratios during our sample 
time period. This indicates that there is a clear trend in capital structure 
adjustment that firms try to follow. This likewise implies that macroeconomic 
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environment prompts firms to change their capital structure. Finally, we observe 
that firms in our sample mainly issue equity during our sample time period, 
which is contrary to the pecking order theory. Consequently, our findings 
generally support the trade-off theory. 
 
Finally, we would like to close this paper by emphasizing our contribution. In this 
paper, we use ANOVA test following Stonehill and Stizel’s (1969) method when 
they compared firms’ debt ratio from different industries. To our best knowledge, 
we have not seen any paper that directly compares debt ratio based on 
countries, industries and time period since Stonehill and Stizel’s and hence we 
provide new evidence on this question. Our second contribution is that we show 
systematic patterns in debt ratios based on industries. For example, without 
exception firms in the software industry have lower debt ratios than firms in the 
hotel industry, across all countries and time periods in our sample. Although, 
this is an easy comparison to make, we have not seen this in research on this 
topic since the Stonehill and Stizel paper. Furthermore, our research methods 
give clear and intuitive results. Finally, there exists an endogeneity problem 
between the regressand and regressor when using panel data with a first order 
autoregressive model. We use a System-GMM model to solve this endogeneity 
problem and hence improve the reliability of our results compared to prior 
studies that do not address this modelling issue.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics (Panel A) and correlation matrix (Panel B) for all firms in 
the sample for the whole period 1989 to 2008. The kurtosis and skewness indicate that some of 
the variables are not normally distributed. The descriptive statistics for stock returns (SR), the 
market-to-book ratio (M/B) and profits suggests that many firms were financially insecure and 
may also indicate firms experienced adverse macroeconomic conditions during our sample 
period. The correlation matrix in Panel B indicates no strong correlation between the variables, 
with the exception of the bankruptcy probability (BP) and the debt ratio (DR). Although high, the 
correlation between these two variables is acceptable as our unreported VIF tests indicate there 
is no significant multi-colinearity present. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
 Panel A: Variables descriptive statistics 
Statistics DR def Lnasset Tang Capex SR tax BP M/B Profit 
Mean 0.1956 0.1953 4.6007 0.2062 0.0546 -0.1823 0.3002 1.7495 2.0093 -0.0698 
Min 0.0000 -3.5156 -4.6052 -0.0082 0.0000 -8.9480 0.0000 1.0000 0.0429 -3.0000 
p25 0.0047 -0.0171 3.1232 0.0488 0.0094 -0.4993 0.0029 1.0000 1.0160 -0.0660 
P50 0.1128 0.0630 4.5692 0.1286 0.0266 -0.0756 0.2485 1.0000 1.3958 0.0326 
p75 0.3072 0.2736 6.1464 0.3004 0.0661 0.2586 0.4164 3.0000 2.3305 0.0903 
p99 1.1013 2.0000 10.2730 0.8228 0.3956 1.1091 2.0804 3.0000 8.5978 0.3746 
Max 1.9144 4.4286 12.5270 0.9125 0.6159 1.2672 13.2500 3.0000 9.9905 1.7714 
Sd 0.2428 0.4290 2.4453 0.2066 0.0776 0.7178 0.5683 0.8820 1.6262 0.3848 
Skew 2.1633 3.0493 -0.1431 1.2963 3.0258 -1.5475 10.7007 0.5099 2.2360 -3.5414 
Kurto 10.4255 19.1971 3.5592 3.8724 14.7390 9.4910 169.456 1.4780 8.3467 19.6015 
Obs 32410 24068 33029 32538 28212 29720 27446 26677 28333 32209 
 Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 DR def Lnasset Tang Capex SR tax BP M/B Profit 
DR 1          
def 0.045 1         
Lnasset 0.0961 -0.3741 1        
Tang 0.3367 -0.0877 0.3237 1       
Capex 0.0878 0.0927 0.1539 0.4302 1      
SR -0.0775 -0.1031 0.1411 0.0733 0.0441 1     
Tax -0.0181 -0.0869 0.1686 0.0433 -0.0125 0.0503 1    
BP 0.5309 0.0546 -0.0433 0.2196 -0.0212 -0.1837 -0.0685 1   
M/B -0.0176 0.2502 -0.2324 -0.1828 0.1117 0.143 -0.1241 -0.0882 1  
Profit -0.1467 -0.4939 0.437 0.111 0.0914 0.2925 0.1808 -0.3401 -0.2349 1 
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Table 2: Description of variables used in the analysis 
 
DIV is the firm’s total dividend payments, I is investment (capital expenditure), WC is the net working capital (total current assets - total current liabilities 
= operating working capital + cash and cash equivalents + current debt), C is cash-flow after interest and taxes (internal cash-flow or net income + 
depreciation), D is the net issue of debt, E the net issue of equity issue. To remove size differences, all items are scaled by total assets. Z-, Z”-, EM 
models are the indices for bankruptcy probability measures; WC is working capital; TA is total assets, RE is retained earnings; ME is the market value of 
equity; EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes; BD is the book value of total debt; SALE is the firm’s sales or turnover; BE is the book value of equity; 
BTL is the book value of total liabilities; OI is operating income. US firms are in the non-bankruptcy area if Z-score is greater than 2.99, in the 
intermediate area if between 1.81 and 2.99, and in the bankruptcy area if below 1.81. Korean and Taiwanese firms are in the non-bankruptcy area if EM 
score is greater than 5.85, the intermediate area if between 4.15 and 5.85, and bankruptcy area, if below 4.15. Finally, firms from all the rest of countries 
are in non-bankruptcy area if Z”-score is greater 2.60, in the intermediate area if between 2.60 and 1.1 and the bankruptcy area if below 1.1. We assign 
the number 1 to the variable of bankruptcy probability (BP) if they are in non-bankruptcy area, 2 if in gray area, and 3 if in the bankruptcy area. 
Variable Description Comment Predicted sign 
Trade-Off Pecking 
Order 
Market 
Timing 
      
Pure issuance (pur) net equity issue – net debt issue = (total equity 
issue – equity repurchase) – (total debt issue 
– total debt retirement) 
Indicator of firm’s 
intent to issue debt or 
equity 
   
      
Debt ratio (DR) total debt/ total assets Book based debt 
ratio 
   
      
Financial deficit (def) * deft = DIVt + It + △WCt –Cft = Dt+Et Frank and Goyal’s 
(2003) definition 
 +  
      
Stock return (SR) SRt = log(stock pricet / stock pricet-1)   – – 
      
Asset tangibility (tang) Tangibility = tangible assets / total assets  + +/–  
      
Capital expenditure (capex) = capital expenditure / total assets  + +/–  
      
Market-to-book ratio (M/B) = (total asset – book equity + market equity) / 
total asset 
  – – 
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Profits = operating profits / total assets  + –  
      
Total assets(Lnasset) = log(total assets)  + +  
      
Corporate tax rate (tax) = (income tax / pre-tax income)  +   
   +   
Bankruptcy probability (BP) ** Z-score for US firms is = 
TA
SALE
0.99
BD
ME
0.6
TA
EBIT
3.3
TA
RE
1.4
TA
WC
1.2   
Z”-score for other developed countries = 
 –   
 
BTL
BE
1.05
TA
EBIT
6.72
TA
RE
3.26
TA
WC
6.56   
EM model for emerging markets = 
Score is 1, if firm is 
predicted as going 
concern;  
2 if intermediate;  
3 if predicted to go 
bankrupt 
–   
 
3.25
BTL
BE
1.05
TA
OI
6.72
TA
RE
2.36
TA
WC
6.56   
 –   
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Table 3: Analysis of variance test between the two time periods 
 
Panel A compares the differences in the means of firms’ debt levels between the period 1989-
1998 and the period 1999-2008 for the whole sample. This shows that there are significant 
differences in debt ratio between the two periods. 
Panel B compares the differences for the means between the two periods using country level 
data. Both Panels present a significant difference in debt ratios between two periods, with the 
exception of the United Kingdom. For brevity, in Panel B, we do not report the full details of 
ANOVA test results such as, the sum of squares (SS), the degrees of freedom (DF) and mean 
square (MS) and provide only the F values and their significant levels. SS: sum of squares, DF: 
degree of freedom, MS: mean square, F: F statistic, Prob:  p-value. *,**,*** statistical 
significances at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Comparison of debt ratios between 1989-99 and 1999-2008 
 
 SS DF MS F Prob> F 
Model 5.4837 1 5.4837 93.31*** 0.0000 
Residual 1904.608 32408 .0587   
Total 1910.092 32409 .0589   
Panel B: Comparison of debt ratios between 1989-99 and 1999-2008, 
based on country classification 
 F statistic Prob> F 
Australia   10.69*** .0011 
Canada    7.50*** .0063 
Germany   18.79*** .0000 
France   31.56*** .0000 
United Kingdom  0.02 .8758 
Japan  237.78*** .0000 
Korea  352.26*** .0000 
Taiwan   30.30*** .0000 
USA   49.29*** .0000 
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Table 4 Analysis of variance tests on debt ratios by country 
 
This table presents a non-random distribution in debt ratios across the countries in the sample. 
In Panel A, F statistics and p-values indicate that there are significant differences in debt ratios 
between countries. Panel B shows the average difference in debt ratio amongst countries for 
the two sub-periods. The F statistics indicate that there are significant differences in debt ratios 
between countries and over time. SS: sum of squares, DF: degree of freedom, MS: mean 
square, F: F statistics, Prob.:  p-value. *,**,*** statistical significances at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: ANOVA test based on 9 different countries 
 
  SS DF MS F Prob 
Whole 
years 
Model 28.5092 8 3.5636 61.37*** .0000 
Residual 1881.5826 32401 .0580   
Total 1910.0919 32409 .0589   
Panel B: ANOVA test based on 9 different countries and the two periods 
  SS DF MS F Prob 
Period 
one 
(1989-98) 
Model 33.9225 8 4.2403 96.46*** .0000 
 Residual 309.4408 7039 .0439   
 Total 343.3633 7047 .0487   
Period 
two 
(1999-08) 
Model 20.1053 8 2.5131 41.34*** .0000 
 Residual 1541.1395 25353 .0607   
 Total 1561.2448 25361 .0615   
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Table 5 ANOVA tests for debt ratios, categorized by industries 
 
Panel A gives evidence for a non-random distribution of debt ratios by industry. The results 
imply that each industry has a unique debt ratio. Panel B likewise presents the same analysis 
but split between 1989-99 and 1999-2008. SS: sum of squares, DF: degree of freedom, MS: 
mean square, F: F statistics, Prob:  p-value. *,**,*** statistical significances at the 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: ANOVA test based on 14 different industries 
 
  SS DF MS F Prob 
Whole 
Period 
Model 179.4630 13 13.8048 258.4*** .0000 
Residual 1730.6288 32396 .0534   
Total 1910.0919 32409 .0589   
 
Panel B: ANOVA test based on 14 different industries and different time periods 
 
  SS DF MS F Prob 
Period 
one 
(1989-98) 
Model 66.9039 13 5.1464 130.94*** .0000 
 Residual 276.4594 7034 .0393   
 Total 343.3633 7047 .0487   
Period 
two 
(1999-08) 
Model 113.6087 13 8.7391 153.02*** .0000 
 Residual 1447.6361 25348 .0571   
 Total 1561.2448 25361 .0615   
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Table 6: Debt ratio adjustment patterns and ranked orders 
 
This table presents firms leverage adjusting behavior by industry. Panel A indicates that, based 
on the average and median values, firms in most industries have reduced their debt ratios over 
the sample period. Panel B shows that there are two clear groups: Firms in biotechnology 
(Biotechn), software, semiconductors (Semicon), computer hardware (Com-hard), computer 
services (Com-serv), heavy construction (Heavy-con), and internet industries have low debt 
ratios. Firms in aluminum, mobile telecommunication (Mobile tel), airline, fixed-line 
telecommunication (Fixed tel), hotel, travel, and marine transportation (M-transport) industries 
have high debt ratios. The results indicate there is a pattern in the way firms adjust their 
leverage levels. 
 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
       Mean Median 
ICB-sub Periods Mean 
Mean 
change 
Median 
Median 
change 
Rank 89-98 99-08 89-98 99-08 
Aluminium 
89-98 .3343 
.0216 
.3241 
.0419 1 Biotechn Software Biotechn Software 
99-08 .3559 .366 
Heavy-con 
89-98 .2169 
-.017 
.1796 
-.022 2 Software Com-serv Software Biotechn 
99-08 .1999 .1576 
M-
transport 
89-98 .4450 
-.0657 
.4830 
-.1073 3 Semicon Semicon Internet Internet 
99-08 .3793 .3757 
Biotechn 
89-98 .1355 
.0336 
.0393 
-.0147 4 Com-hard Internet Semicon Com-serv 
99-08 .1691 .0246 
Airlines 
89-98 .3504 
.0517 
.3306 
.0677 5 Com-serv Biotechn Com-serv Semicon 
99-08 .4021 .3983 
Hotels 
89-98 .4162 
-.0651 
.4097 
-.0695 6 Heavy-con Com-hard Com-hard Com-hard 
99-08 .3511 .3402 
Travel 
89-98 .4319 
-.0954 
.4868 
-.1566 7 Internet Heavy-con Heavy-con Heavy-con 
99-08 .3365 .3302 
Fixed tel 
89-98 .3507 
-.0142 
.3364 
-.0367 8 Aluminium Mobile tel Aluminium Mobile tel 
99-08 .3637 .2997 
Mobile tel 
89-98 .3448 
-.1069 
.3305 
-.1569 9 Mobile tel Travel Mobile tel Fixed tel 
99-08 .2379 .1736 
Com-serv 
89-98 .1719 
-.022 
.1145 
-.0421 10 Airlines Fixed tel Airlines Travel 
99-08 .1499 .0724 
Internet 
89-98 .2280 
-.0655 
.0924 
-.0607 11 Fixed tel Hotels Fixed tel Hotels 
99-08 .1625 .0317 
Software 
89-98 .1375 
.0095 
.044 
-.0201 12 Hotels Aluminium Hotels Aluminium 
99-08 .1470 .0239 
Com-hard 
89-98 .1717 
.0018 
.1347 
-.0069 13 Travel 
M-
transport 
M-
transport 
M-
transport 99-08 .1735 .1278 
Semicon 
89-98 .1568 
.00 
.1045 
-.0128 14 
M-
transport 
Airlines Travel Airlines 
99-08 .1568 .0917 
Total 
89-98 .2202 
-.0315 
.1615 
-.0647 
     
99-08 .1887 .0968      
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Table 7: Capital structure adjustment by country 
 
This table summarizes the capital structure adjustment behavior of firms across the sample 
countries. Panel A shows that the change in debt ratio (ΔDRt) indicates firms mainly use equity 
to adjust their debt ratios. Panel B shows that firms mainly use equity for increasing the amount 
of cash in their balance sheets. Panel C indicates that firms adjust their capital structure toward 
their optimal levels. In Panel C, to measure the speed at which firms adjust their capital 
structure, we use a two-stage System GMM estimator with one and two period lagged debt 
ratios as instruments. We presume that only debt ratios are endogenous as can be seen in 
Equations (6) and (7). US: Australia, CAN: Canada, UK: Britain, USA: the United States, DEU: 
Germany, FRA: France, JPN: Japan, KOR: Korea and TWN: Taiwan. *,**,*** statistical 
significances at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
 Panel A: ΔDRt 
 Whole AUS CAN UK US DEU FRA JPN KOR TWN 
Cons -.0007 
(-.72) 
.0021 
(.34) 
.0045 
(.78) 
.0028 
(.67) 
.0051 
(2.56)** 
.0024 
(.052) 
-.0052 
(-1.73)* 
-.0118 
(-8.7)*** 
-.0007 
(-0.2) 
-.0031 
(-1.42) 
Deft -.0098 
(-4.32)*** 
.0064 
(.69) 
.0026 
(.27) 
-.0484 
(-5.47)*** 
-.0094 
(-2.55)** 
-.0362 
(-2.98)*** 
.0018 
(.18) 
-.0131 
(-2.72)*** 
-.007 
(-.6) 
-.0074 
(-1.00) 
R2 .0008 .0005 .0001 .0175 .0007 .0073 .00 .0016 .0003 .0004 
Obs 23883 923 914 1681 9347 1209 1325 4611 1340 2533 
 Panel B: Pure issuet 
 Whole AUS CAN UK US DEU FRA JPN KOR TWN 
Cons .0168 
(7.52)*** 
.0596 
(4.05)*** 
.0400 
(2.94)*** 
.0362 
(4.28)*** 
.0247 
(6.72)*** 
.0113 
(1.60) 
.0177 
(3.47)*** 
.0089 
(4.20)*** 
-.0062 
(-1.07)*** 
.0039 
(1.43) 
Deft .3506 
(76.44)*** 
.4147 
(18.61)*** 
.4958 
(19.76)*** 
.3883 
(22.95)*** 
.3409 
(53.38)*** 
.2690 
(11.1)*** 
.0631 
(2.97)*** 
.0691 
(6.15)*** 
.2637 
(12.81)*** 
-.0584 
(-4.68)*** 
R2 .2414 .2898 .3716 .2400 .2358 .1912 .0118 .0165 .1307 .0148 
Obs 18367 851 662 1670 9236 523 679 2258 1094 1394 
 Panel C: DRt 
 Whole AUS CAN UK US DEU FRA JPN KOR TWN 
Cons .0002 
(.04) 
.0114 
(.379) 
-.0405 
(-5.79)*** 
-.0056 
(-.85) 
.0186 
(1.43) 
.0223 
(3.46)*** 
.0084 
(1.26) 
-.0196 
(-3.7)*** 
-.0278 
(-2.33)** 
.001 
(.08) 
DRt-1 .7283 
(28.78)*** 
.5366 
(45.91)** 
.5538 
(64.92)** 
.7294 
(29.14)*** 
.6434 
(17.92)*** 
.7887 
(114.85)*** 
.8271 
(140.71)*** 
.8892 
(37.84)*** 
.6513 
(50.68)*** 
.6832 
(19.26)*** 
BPt-1 .0073 
(2.27)** 
.0207 
(7.39)*** 
.0197 
(16.35)*** 
-.0000 
(-.02) 
.0221 
(2.89)*** 
-.0011 
(-.54) 
-.0058 
(-2.36)** 
.0073 
(1.91)* 
-.0004 
(-.12) 
.0077 
(1.17) 
Ln(asset)t-
1 
.0037 
(4.36)*** 
.0058 
(3.74)*** 
.0067 
(5.81)*** 
.0035 
(4.39)*** 
.0009 
(.53) 
-.0012 
(-1.97)** 
.0029 
(5.97)*** 
.0018 
(2.37)** 
.0166 
(8.98)*** 
.0061 
(3.16)*** 
Tang .0549 
(5.04)*** 
.0265 
(1.54) 
.0969 
(5.97)*** 
.0580 
(4.39)*** 
.0583 
(2.89)*** 
.0837 
(9.34)*** 
.0672 
(7.90)*** 
.0215 
(1.97)** 
-.0028 
(-.18) 
.0281 
(1.55) 
Tax .0029 
(2.56)** 
-.0070 
(-3.36)*** 
.0068 
(9.28)*** 
.0135 
(2.21)** 
.001 
(.30) 
-.0014 
(-.62) 
-.0151 
(-3.35)*** 
.0035 
(2.73)*** 
.0221 
(8.41)*** 
.0033 
(.7) 
Capex .0565 
(2.51)** 
.1394 
(3.21)*** 
.1977 
(7.44)*** 
.0671 
(2.66)*** 
.0316 
(.78) 
.0516 
(5.20)*** 
.0632 
(2.42)** 
.0305 
(.74) 
.1385 
(6.08)*** 
.1037 
(2.73)*** 
M/B .0021 
(1.80)* 
-.0059 
(-2.43)** 
.0022 
(1.68)* 
-.000 
(-.04) 
.0030 
(1.47) 
-.0010 
(-1.20) 
.0087 
(4.59)*** 
-.0001 
(-.09) 
-.0101 
(-4.14)*** 
-.0064 
(-1.53) 
Profit -.0147 
(-1.44)* 
.0412 
(5.11)*** 
-.0193 
(-2.18)** 
-.0003 
(-.02) 
-.0221 
(-1.34) 
.0104 
(1.59) 
.0272 
(1.80)* 
.0746 
(1.96)* 
.0389 
(1.04) 
.0521 
(1.19) 
SR -.0111 
(-5.13)*** 
-.0141 
(-3.64)*** 
.0006 
(.29) 
-.0100 
(-4.56)*** 
-.0117 
(-2.69)*** 
.0077 
(5.05)*** 
-.0195 
(-7.25)*** 
-.0094 
(-4.03)*** 
-.0036 
(-1.70)* 
-.0005 
(-.1)*** 
AR(1) -8.36*** -2.59** -2.89*** -3.45*** -5.23*** -2.81*** -3.64*** -5.34*** -1.96** -6.57*** 
AR(2) .72 .42 .97 -.30 .37 .83 -1.6 1.58 .74 -.90 
Hansen  
[p-
value] 
60.87 
[.162] 
30.63 
[.976] 
45.23 
[.701] 
50.53 
[.492] 
44.16 
[.740] 
46.88 
[.406] 
53.83 
[.367] 
96.29 
[.000] 
55.01 
[.326] 
37.17 
[.642] 
Inst L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 L1, L2 
Obs 14302 676 489 1180 4437 679 748 4045 532 1516 
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Figure 
 
Figure 1: Debt ratios over time 
 
Figure 1 shows the changes in debt ratio by country during the sample period 1989-2008. Of 
particular note is the way debt ratios converge in the latter part of our sample period across all 
countries. The figure strongly indicates that on average for each country in the sample there is a 
pattern to how firms are adjusting their debt ratios. AUS: Australia, CAN: Canada, UK: Britain, 
USA: the United States, DEU: Germany, FRA: France, JPN: Japan, KOR: Korea and TWN: 
Taiwan.  
 
 
